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Abstract 
Traffic anomaly detection systems require not only efficiency and accuracy but also the ability of containment. For 
those special requirements, an anomaly detection system is proposed based on Filter-ary-Sketch. It records the traffic 
in Filter-ary-Sketch and detects anomalies over it. When an anomaly is detected, the anomalous dimension is notices 
and malicious buckets are identified. Finally, malicious packets are blocked using the packets filter algorithm. Using 
some traffic traces from backbone networks, we demonstrate that our system can detect anomalies with high accuracy, 
low computation and memory costs, and block the packets that are responsible for anomalies. 
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1. Introduction 
With the continuous development of network science and technology and the explosive increase of all 
kinds of network applications, the Internet has become an important infrastructure which deeply affects 
politics, economy, military affairs and culture. Meanwhile, problems of network security have become 
more and more serious. Flash crowd and network based attacks, such as DDOS, worm burst, large-scale 
port scan, become increasingly frequent. To early and accurate warn and mitigate of these large-scale 
anomalies, anomaly detection and blocking of malicious packets are needed. However, anomaly detection 
and characterization is an involved task especially in high speed networks. First, the run-time efficiency of 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +86-0135-48586183 
E-mail address: lmzheng@nudt.edu.cn. 
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.
4298  Liming Zheng et al. / Procedia Engineering 29 (2012) 4297 – 43062 Liming Zheng / Procedia Engineering 00 (2011) 000–000 
algorithm used to detected anomalies must be high because early detection before worms’ expeditious 
propagation or the detection close to source address when the network suffered from DDoS attack was 
especially important which can only possibly be achieved by detection at high speed networks in the core 
of the Internet. Second, with the constantly and promptly emergence of new malware and rapid growth of 
network bandwidth, the signature base IDS turns obsolete when one detect anomalies. Last but not least, 
regular traffic in itself exhibits a wild variability and there is basic rate fallacy in the anomaly detection 
field, both significantly impair the detection of anomalies. Moreover, anomaly detection systems should 
not just detect possible anomalies, but should also annotate detection with some useful information which 
is help for identifying malicious flows. 
Because that nether speed or accuracy is easy to achieve when extracted and mined anomalous patterns 
from massive and noisy traffic data of high-speed networks, a large number of network traffic anomaly 
detection systems, such as machine learning, data mining and so on, were proposed to address these 
challenges. According to the granularity of traffic pattern, detection systems can be classified into two 
classes, systems based on overall traffic and on flow level traffic. Systems based on overall traffic needs 
less storage consumption and compute resource, but were inaccurate. It also could not identify anomalies 
flows or provide detailed information about anomalies. Moreover, Systems run well only when it detects 
some specific class of attacks, and its rate of false positive or false negative is high when face other 
classes of attacks. The flow-level detection systems can detect and identify anomalies precisely, and offer 
administrator detailed view, but the storage consumption and compute resource are much higher, failing 
them in large-scale and high-speed networks. Furthermore, when the DDOS attacks launched by a large-
scale botnet break out, memory overflow may occur in the flow-level detection systems. 
In this paper, an anomaly detection system is proposed based on the summary data structure Filter-ary-
Sketch. It records the traffic in Filter-ary-Sketch online and detects anomalies based on one class support 
vector machine. When an anomaly is detected, malicious buckets identified according to KL distance 
between observed sketch and forecasting sketch. Finally, malicious packets were blocked using a packets 
blocking algorithm. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2, we review related work; the key data 
structure and algorithm of our system and blocking algorithm are described in section 3; in section 4, the 
detection system proposed in the paper is validated by real traffic traces; and we sum up all the work and 
look into the future of our research in the last section. 
2. Related Work 
Anomaly detection systems are widely applied because they can detect “zero days” attacks and are 
adaptable over high-speed networks. Its main idea is to build a normal traffic model using historical traffic, 
and then detect the behaviors which are deviated from the model recently as anomalies. Since the speed of 
arrived IP packets in high-speed networks generally reaches millions packets per second, and the address 
space of single dimensionality in IPv4 is 232, the anomaly detection systems using existing algorithms on 
traffic to detect anomalies are incompetent and the improvement is to decrease the quantity of data needed 
to be dealt with by means of dimension reduction methods. The dimension reduction methods of traffic 
data include sampling, aggregating, PCA (principal component analysis) and Sketch. It’s pointed out that 
some important information may lose in the sampling process [1]. Moreover, studies on evaluating the 
effect of sampling to various detection algorithms show that the error of anomaly detection algorithm 
increased when it used the data after sampling. The malicious flows might present normal behavior 
characters after aggregation, whereas the normal traffic might present anomaly behavior characters after 
aggregation [2]. PCA is a coordinate transform method and the main component is the new axis to which 
PCA projected the designated data point. There are some traffic anomaly detection systems based on PCA 
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[3], but this algorithm is easily compromised by stealthy attacks [4]. Sketch from data stream field is 
applied in quick querying of large traffic and data stream [5]. What it need do is to maintain a real-time 
update synopsis structure on data stream in order to meet the demand of quick queries predefined by users 
with predetermined precision bounds. Sketch is an effective synopsis structure with little consumption of 
memory, and it even can be transplanted to SRAM. The complexity of computing and updating is low and 
usually reaches O(ploy(logn0))( n0 is the number of distinct bins in sketch). Sketch could assure precision 
theoretically and meet the need of real-time traffic processing in large-scale networks; therefore it has 
been widely applied in network security field. Count-min sketch structure was proposed by using hash 
function [6]; k-ary sketch structure was proposed to be applied in change-point detection in [7]. They also 
introduced  heuristics for automatically configuring the model parameters. However, the anomaly 
detection methods based on sketch could not offer detailed information of attackers and the false positive 
rate is not low enough. Though malicious flows could be extracted using reversible sketch [8] or 
association rules [9], but they was highly complex. In addition, because the IP spoofing technology adopt 
by attackers was prevalently, the effect of reversing source IP was not necessary. In order to improve the 
accuracy of anomaly detection systems based on sketch, researchers have begun to monitor the 
distributing character of traffic to detect anomalies and adopt entropy to measure this distribution 
character based on sketch or histogram.  The author of [10] detected anomalies by comparing the 
differences of current distribution and a reference one, and a method based on maximum entropy principle 
to flexibly estimate reference distribution was introduced. In [11], detailed histogram model was 
constructed and cluster algorithm was introduced to classify the normal and abnormal. However, there are 
some limitations. Anomaly detection systems critically rely upon the quality of the training data used to 
construct their models. In addition, it is difficult to obtain enough high quality data, especially the 
anomaly samples. One class classification method is more appropriate for the anomaly detection filed. 
3. Data Structure and Algorithm 
3.1. Filter-ary-Sketch 
Network traffic data have different dimensions (features). Suppose the number of dimensions is d, 
each item is denoted as Xi=[xi,1,xi,2,…,xi,d]. The traffic data have different distributions in different 
dimensions. Source IP, destination IP, source Port, destination Port and the length of IP packets were 
chosen as the dimensions to detect anomalies in this paper. Certainly, more dimensions could be easily 
added. L=a0,a1, … denotes the input stream in which data arrive one by one, the ith item is denoted as 
ai=(SIPj,DIPi,Sporti,Dporti,Plengthi,ui), ui represents the eigenvalue of the data item,  
[N]k=Dom(xi,,k)={0,1, …,nk-1},0≤k≤d is the state space of the kth dimension. When a data item arrives, the 
buckets that correspond to its label in every dimension were updated, namely U[ai,k,k]+= ui. When it is 
applied in detecting anomalies, the eigenvalue of each data item is the number of IP packets or bytes. The 
system records number of IP packets as the eigenvalue, then ui  is set to 1. 
Filter-ary-Sketch data structure consists of two parts: hash functions, ary-Sketch structures. The hash 
function, as the core of the random project technology, projects the traffic data of high dimensions to low 
dimensions space randomly. The value space of hash function is usually far less than the input space and 
different input may result in the same output, namely there are collision and irreversibility. In order to 
achieve wide applicability and control the probability of collision in predefined bounds, we choose 
universal hash classes [13] in this paper, namely:  
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p is a prime number bigger than the number of [N]k, δi is the random element in prime number space [p] 
and k is the general hash function level. In order to reduce the complexity, k is assigned to 2. 
Filter-ary-Sketch data structure uses an h×M table of registers to store statistics in every 
dimension. Each row of the table corresponds to a hash function and all of these hash functions are 
independent with each other. M registers of each row represent M buckets of hash functions, and 
each register record the eiqenvalue statistics of data item projected to this bucket. The values of M 
registers in each row were collected to form a vector. Generally, some attacks may not be visible 
along one dimension, but may be identified using more dimensions or combinations of dimensions. 
The system detects anomalies on several dimensions, and also needs set Filter-ary-Sketch structure 
on each dimension. The whole structure of Filter-ary-Sketch is shown in Fig. 1.  
Dimension Selecting
Data
Stream
Hash1,1
Hash1,2
Hash1,h
Hashd,1
Hashd,2
Hashd,h
0 1 2 M1,1
0 1 2 M1,2
0 1 2 M1,h
0 1 2 Md,1
0 1 2 Md,2
0 1 2 Md,h
 
Fig. 1. Filter-ary-Sketch data structure 
3.2. Anomaly detection algorithm 
After completion of data recording on each window, each row of the sketch in every dimension which 
consists of M registers forms a detection vector. In order to detect anomalies accurately and automated, 
OCSVM is used to classify the detection vectors. The data items which have abnormal behavior are 
defined as negative samples, while normal data item as positive samples. OCSVM, a kind of non-
supervised learning method, is developed on the base of SVM, which was firstly proposed in [15] and 
used to solve the One-Class classification problems. OCSVM can distinguish anomaly from the normal 
samples, and mark them as abnormal samples. OCSVM assumes that the probability distribution of the 
dataset in the feature space is P, and a subset of feature space is S, then the probability of a test point in 
the dataset falling outside S is defined as an optimized character value υ∈ (0, 1). This method is achieved 
by estimating the function g which values +1 in the region containing most points and -1 in the other 
region. 
The main idea of OCSVM is projecting the data to a feature space via an appropriate kernel function, 
and trying to find the optimal separation surface between the origin projecting vector and the maximum 
interval. When we are given a training set ( ),( ) { 1}, , Ni i i ix x Ry y ∈ × ± , we let :
N
HRΦ →  be a kernel function 
to project training samples to the feature space, which is denoted as ( , ) ( ( ) ( ))k x y x y= Φ • Φ . Kernel 
functions have various of forms, for example, Gaussian kernel: 
2
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the dataset, which is equal to solve the following quadratic programming problem: 
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In above quotations, υ∈ (0, 1) is the control parameter, which controls the compromise between the 
false rate and generalization. In other words, it controls the training error and model complexity. 
( ) (( ( ) ) )f x sng w x b ρ= • Φ + −  is the decision function, which classifies the majority of samples of the 
training set into the positive class.  
Used Lagrange multiplier method to solve this problem, we get the decision function: 
( ) sgn( )( , )
i ii
g x a k x x ρ= −∑ , and classify the sample according to the decision function. In the system, it 
needs to do more sophisticated analyses, so g(x) is defined as ( ) ( , )
i ii
g x a k x x ρ= −∑ .  
3.3. Malicious packets blocking algorithm 
During time window t, an anomaly detection module constructs vectors for different rows and 
different traffic dimensions. At the end of this window, the decision function of OCSVM was 
computed. If the value is large enough, that the possibility of anomalies is large, it labels the sketch as 
reference sketch and recode traffic in the current sketch in the next window. At the end of the t+1 
window, it computes entropy and the KL distance between the distribution of the current sketch and the 
reference sketch. Entropy has wildly used in anomaly detection field and is defined 
as
0
( ) log( )
n
i ii
H m m m m
=
= −∑ . mi denoted the frequency of data item i and the totality of data items of 
the data stream in current window is denoted by m , 
1
n
ii
m m== ∑ .The KL distance has been successfully 
applied to provide Meta-Data about anomalies [10] [16]. It measures the difference of a given distribution 
P to a reference distribution Q over the same space Ω and is defined as: 
( || ) log( )
i i ii
D P Q P P Q
∈Ω
= ∑  
When an anomaly is detected during window t, we want to identify which dimension is involved in the 
anomaly and set Bk of malicious buckets in involved dimension. We sample selected the dimension in 
which the entropy is suddenly smaller and the normalized reduction is the largest and the buckets with the 
largest absolute distance maxk|Pk-Qk| between the current sketch and the reference sketch in each row for 
the anomalous dimension. For example, some traffic dimensions exhibit diverging behaviors during 
DDoS outbreak such as the distributions of the destination IP will become more skewed around the IP of 
the victim, and entropy and KL distance are used to capture this dynamics. So the destination IP 
dimension may be the anomalous dimension and the buckets contributing the most to the decrease of the 
entropy are identified with the help of the KL distance. We define the set of feature values that hash into 
the malicious buckets as Vk. The cardinality of Vk is much larger than set of the feature values of 
malicious flows, so we filter the feature values that have been identified by all rows in anomalous 
dimension of the sketch. The detailed process is described as Algorithm1. 
 
Algorithm 1: The blocking algorithm 
Malicious buckets Identifying 
1: for each dimension dk 
2:    if a decrease in the entropies series for this dimension is noticed and the normalized reduction is 
the largest, this dimension is the anomalous dimension 
3:        for each row i in the anomalous dimension of sketch ri,k 
4:              MBi,k←j satisfy maxj|Pj-Qj| 
Malicious packets blocking: 
5: extracting feature values for every packets in anomalous dimension 
6: for each row i in the anomalous dimension of the sketch 
7:    if the feature values hashed into the  MBi,k 
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8:           Ri,k←true 
9: if all Ri,k is true, this packet is blocked 
 
Because the set of feature values Vk. provided by the malicious buckets identifying algorithm is likely 
to contain many normal feature values colliding on this buckets, it's possible to block normal packets as 
malicious ones. The accuracy of anomaly flows blocking is analyzed as follows: the error of malicious 
packets blocking results from two aspects: the error brought by malicious buckets identifying algorithm 
and the error brought by random projection of sketch. In the blocking algorithm, all the Ri,k is true, the 
packet is blocked, however, but the packet is blocked when the number of the Ri,k which equals true 
greater than a threshold in practice because there is error in malicious buckets identifying algorithm. It is 
known that in the building process of Filter-ary-Sketch, the mean of the number of elements corresponded 
to each hash bucket is α/Md, in which α is the mean of the number of items in each window and Mk is the 
number of hash buckets in certain dimension. The data structure in current dimension has hk independent 
hash functions, then the probability that an innocent feature value appears in hk  malicious buckets 
is ( )1 khkM  . 
4. Experiment and Result Analysis 
The evaluation of the anomaly detection systems mainly focuses on two aspects: the accuracy and 
efficiency. The accuracy means the anomalies are supposed to be detecting correctly, and the false 
positive rate and false negative rate are bounded; efficiency means anomalies can be detected in a period 
of time which is short enough and the consumption of storage and computing is acceptable. To evaluate 
the system in these two aspects, we have designed three experiments. Experiment 1 mainly focuses on the 
accuracy of the proposed detection algorithm; Experiment 2 focuses on the accuracy of the proposed 
blocking algorithm; the efficiency of the system is analyzed in Experiment 3. 
4.1. Detection evaluating 
To evaluate the proposed detection algorithm, we used two different datasets: synthetic traffic traces 
and real traffic traces collected form the backbone networks of the Internet. Synthetic datasets were 
constructed by combining the malicious traces with the background traffic. Real traffic traces are the 
MAWI traffic traces [17] of the WIDE project collected at one of the trans-Pacific links (samplepoint-F, 
150Mbps link) between Japan and the United States. Real traffic traces are collected on March 19 2008 
and March 30, 2009. The background trace used in constructing synthetic datasets is also the MAWI 
traces and the collection time is from 02:00 to 04:00 on March 30, 2009. Malicious traces released by 
CAIDA [18] include Witty worm traces, DDoS 2007 traces, Conficker worm traces. Witty traces are 
collected by the UCSD Network Telescope which suck all unexpected traffic arriving at a 8/ network, and 
it contains the first 16 minutes of the Witty exploiting packets when the worm breaks out; DDOS 2007 
traces is a large-scale ICMP-DDoS attack breaking out on May 1, 2007 collected by CAIDA, 15 minutes’ 
trace of which are employed in this experiment just when it breaks out. The Conficker worm is a typical 
stealthy worm, which employs some methods, such as sleep, to reduce scan rate effectively, trying to 
evade the detection of existing detection systems. Conficker trace is collected by CAIDA via the 
Telescope as the Witty worm datasets did and we extract the traces in the first 20 minutes from 19 o’clock 
in November 2 2008. Table 1 summarizes these four traces. In order to construct synthetic datasets, 20% 
of the Witty trace, 2% of DDOS 2007 trace and 50% of the Conficker trace are injected into the 
background traffic respectively. The time series of the synthetic datasets is shown in Fig. 2. The top of the 
figure is the time series of the background traces, time series of synthetic traces are show in the middle, 
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and time series of attack traces are plotted in the button. The x-axis is time (in minute) and y-axis is the 
number of packets per minute. 
Table 1 Character of the Traces 
Features Background Witty DDoS 2007 Conficker
Data Sets MAWI CAIDA CAIDA CAIDA 
Period/min 120 16 10 21 
Num. of  packets 114468114 10493785 77081834 5062733 
Data volume/GB 9.69 4.39 3.27 2.65 
Bandwidth/Mbps 143.14 100 81 100 
Num. of IPs 851243 856775 8597 2212053 
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Fig. 2. Time Series of Synthetic Traffic Traces 
Real traffic traces used in this experiment were collected on March 19 2008 and March 30, 2009, and 
both are part of a Day in the Life of the Internet project. We first inspection this traces and label the 
anomaly windows by hand. Fig. 3 shows the time series of the traffic traces and the anomalies windows 
are labeled with the red line. There are four periods of anomaly on March 19 2008 and three periods of 
anomaly on March 30 2009. 
In order to verify the accuracy of detection algorithm, three well-know systems were selected for use 
in comparing accuracy: EWMA, Entropy based [19] and KL distance based [9] [10]. EWMA is the basic 
method which predicts the traffic volume using EWMA model to detect anomalies. Entropy based 
method is widely used but its time and space complexity is too high to run in real-time. The KL distance 
was used to measure the divergence when compared the packets class distributions observed with the 
baseline distribution. Instead of training and recalibrating the baseline distribution, we use the distribution 
from the previous observed window as reference distribution P [9]. The parameters of the Filter-ary-
Sketch are configured according to the method introduce in [7]: H takes 8; K takes 1024 in the 
source/target IP dimensions and 256 in the source / target port as well as IP packet length dimension; α 
takes 0.5 in EWMA. The time interval is 1 minute. Fig. 4 displays an evaluation of the accuracy of the 
proposed method and the three methods over synthetic traces, and another evaluation of the accuracy over 
real traffic traces shows in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 3. Time Series of Real Traffic Traces 
An accurate method tends to draw the ROC curve toward the upper left corner in the figure and the 
area under curve is a measure of accuracy. Fig. 4.a, Fig. 4.b and Fig. 4.c respectively, show the ROC 
curves of the Witty worm attack, DDoS attack in 2007 and Conficker worm attack. In the Witty worm 
attack, the proposed method is the best, but, in the DDoS attack and the Conficker attack the entropy 
based method is better than the proposed method. Comprehensive consideration, the proposed method is 
a good choice especially detecting anomaly on-line. 
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Fig. 4. ROC curves of four methods on synthetic traces 
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Fig. 5. ROC curves of four methods on real traffic traces 
4.2. Blocking evaluating 
To evaluate the accuracy of the proposed packets blocking algorithm, the three synthetic traces 
constructed in the previous experiment are used. In the Witty worm attack, the source port dimension was 
selected as anomalous dimension; the destination IP dimension is packed in the DDoS 2007 attack; the 
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system choose the destination port dimension to filter malicious packets in the Conficker worm attack. 
Fig. 6 shows an evaluation of the blocking algorithm. In the Witty attack, most of the malicious packets 
are filtered; in DDoS 2007 attack, all the malicious packets are blocked precisely; in the Conficker attack, 
most of the malicious packets are filtered and the error is the largest. Through careful analysis of results, 
we find that error of the blocking algorithm is small and the experimental error mainly comes from that 
some normal packets also uses the feature value identified as malicious. 
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Fig. 6. Performance of blocking algorithm on synthetic traces 
4.3. Efficiency analysis 
The proposed system can be divided into four periods: Updating Sketch, Detection, Identifying and 
Blocking. The time of updating sketch and blocking both mainly consumed in computing the hash 
functions, so we analyze the time of updating sketch no longer. In detection period, the running time is 
mainly the time of classification and the computational complexity of classification using OCSVM is 
stationary when the number of dimensions is fixed. In identifying period, the running time include two 
sections: computing entropy and computing KL distance. The computational complexity of computing 
entropy is O(h*(2M+1)) and the computational complexity of computing KL distance is O(h*(3M+1)) in 
every dimension. The computational complexity of blocking is O(M+1). In summary, the computational 
complexity of the proposed system is a function of h and M and does not change with the traffic. So, it 
can scale to high-speed networks. 
5. Conclusion and further work 
In order to solve problems encountered in anomaly detection especially in high-speed networks, Filter-
ary-Sketch data structure is proposed in this paper. Based on this multi-dimension sketch data structure, 
the system records the traffic in Filter-ary-Sketch online and detects anomalies based on one class support 
vector machine. When an anomaly is detected, the anomalous dimension for which a decrease is notices 
in their entropies series and the malicious buckets are identified using the concept of KL distance. Finally, 
malicious packets are blocked using the packets filter algorithm which based on meta-data generated by 
the malicious buckets identifying algorithm.  
Whereas, anomaly detection algorithm based on Filter-ary-Sketch does not guarantee the theoretical 
accuracy; and dimension choosing of this system and multi-dimensional integrating method requires 
further theoretical and experimental proof. These will be the focus of future works. 
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